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Abstract: The disastrous Dieppe Raid 
of August 1942 has received a great 
deal of attention from historians since 
the end of the Second World War. 
This article examines the training 
given to officers of infantry units of 
the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division 
using the Fusiliers Mont-Royal (FMR) 
as a case study. The article contends 
that the infantry officers were not 
ready, as their tactical training was 
impeded by the absence of a common 
doctrine, the lack of realism, and time 
constraints. FMR’s junior leadership 
therefore lacked speed, initiative, 
and instinct, all vital elements for 
an operation as risky as Operation 
Jubilee.
At dawn on 19 August 1942, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division 
launched an attack on the French town 
of Dieppe. Of the 4,953 Canadians 
landed on the beaches at Dieppe, only 
2,210 men returned to British soil at 
the end of this fateful day. The raid 
has captured the interest of historians 
and broad audiences ever since 
because it was the Canadian Army’s 
first major European engagement of 
war and because the tactical failure 
of the raid was marked by high 
casualties. Debates over the planning 
and execution of the operation have 
fuelled scholarly and popular interest 
in the assault.1 
Yet, despite the exploration of 
new questions and sources in recent 
years,2 few authors have focussed 
on the training of the infantry that 
participated in the operation. Existing 
studies mainly look at the failure 
of Yukon I and II, two large-scale 
combined exercises in June 1942 
whose objective was to rehearse the 
operation. C.P. Stacey, the official 
historian of the Canadian Army, 
states that “Yukon [I] did not go 
well. Units were landed miles from 
the proper beaches, and the tank 
landing craft arrived over an hour 
late.”3 Several historians have echoed 
Stacey’s critical assessment of the 
exercises.4 Paul Douglas Dickson, who 
mainly bases his analysis on the 1942 
Combined Operations Headquarters 
report, notes more specifically the 
need for such exercises to more 
realistically replicate operational 
conditions.5
The problem with these studies 
is that they do not allow us to assess 
the quality of the training at the unit 
and sub-unit level. One exception 
is Douglas Russell Benneweis’ MA 
thesis, a case study of the South 
Saskatchewan Regiment. He notes 
the wide variation in the level and 
extent of the training within the 
Canadian battalions, a result of the 
significant latitude left to the officers 
in the implementation of training 
programs. According to Benneweis, 
there was also a lack of realism and 
of standardized methods to assess the 
training.6 However, his findings do 
not dwell on the training with regard 
to the particular characteristics of 
Operation Jubilee. Bill Rawling 
discusses the training given to 
Canadian battalions in Dieppe 1942: 
La catastrophe, but he was more 
reluctant to question its overall value. 
He maintains that the commando 
training received by the soldiers on 
the Isle of Wight was essential and 
particularly beneficial to men during 
the operation.7 In his book Tragedy at 
Dieppe: Operation Jubilee, August 19, 
1942, Mark Zuehlke calls attention to 
unit training, which took place almost 
exclusively at the company level or 
lower. According to him, choices 
had to be made because of the lack of 
time, which resulted in “virtually no 
battalion-scale exercises and nothing 
at all at the brigade or divisional 
level” in the period before the Yukon 
I and II exercises.8 
In the end, these studies do not 
provide a measure of the training 
state of the junior leaders involved 
in the raid, the ultimate architects of 
unit effectiveness, especially in this 
type of operation. This article will not 
question the relevance and weight 
of the various reasons developed in 
the literature to explain the failure 
of the Dieppe raid. Its intention is to 
expand the scope of the discussion 
by focusing on the training provided 
to the units’ officers, employing as a 
case study the Fusiliers Mont-Royal 
(FMR). For the men of this unit, an 
amphibious operation constituted a 
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type of operation with which they 
were unfamiliar and which included 
several activities outside their 
normal duties. It is thus important 
to understand how the unit’s officers 
were prepared for the task that was 
assigned to them on the beach at 
Dieppe. In order to do that, one 
needs to go back to the beginning 
of the war and even a bit further to 
be able to assess all of the factors 
influencing the FMR’s training before 
Operation Jubilee and to appreciate 
the difficult enterprise the men had in 
front of them. Before examining the 
regiment’s preparation, it is useful to 
begin with the operation and what 
happened in the small coastal town 
of Dieppe. 
Operation Jubilee
The attack on Dieppe involved n e a r l y  5 , 0 0 0  m e n  f r o m 
2nd Canadian Infantry Division 
accompanied by a Canadian tank 
regiment and British Commando 
and Royal Marine troops. The plan 
called for limited fire support from 
Royal Navy (RN) destroyers and 
squadrons of the Royal Air Force 
(RAF). The first phase of the landing 
would begin at 0450 hours. To the 
east, No.3 Commando would launch 
the assault at Berneval (Yellow 
Beach) while the Royal Regiment 
of Canada with three platoons of 
the Black Watch (Royal Highland 
Regiment) of Canada would push 
towards Puys (Blue Beach). To the 
west, No.4 Commando would rush 
to Varengeville (Orange Beach) and 
the South Saskatchewan Regiment 
and the Queen’s Own Cameron 
Highlanders of Canada would land 
at Pourville (Green Beach). 
The Commandos’ task was 
to eliminate the German coastal 
batteries on each side of Dieppe. 
The Canadians’ objective was to 
first occupy Puys and Pourville to 
neutralize the machine gun posts and 
artillery batteries which protected the 
beaches in front of Dieppe, as well as 
destroy local targets. At 0520 hours, 
the Essex Scottish Regiment and 
the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry 
(RHLI), along with tanks of the 
Calgary Regiment, would launch a 
frontal attack on Dieppe (Red and 
White Beaches). The FMR and A 
Commando Royal Marine would 
serve as the floating reserve and 
exploit any favourable situation in 
addition to occupying the perimeter 
in order to provide a protective 
screen for withdrawing units who 
had completed their tasks.9 
The frontal attack began as 
planned. Unfortunately, the RHLI 
and the Essex Scottish were to open 
the assault without the essential 
artillery support of the tanks, since 
the latter landed ten to fifteen 
minutes late. In addition, the heavy 
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fire sustained by men on Red and 
White Beaches made matters worse. 
The flank assaults failed to wrest the 
coastal batteries from German control 
and the guns remained pointed at 
the Dieppe beaches. These factors 
combined to halt the Canadians at 
Dieppe and only a few small groups 
of men were able to infiltrate the city. 
It was impossible to neutralize the 
enemy and achieve the objectives. 
According to the initial plan, the FMR 
was supposed to concentrate on the 
Parc Jehan Ango in order to cover 
the withdrawal of other Canadian 
units. Major-General J.H. Roberts, 
commanding officer of 2nd Canadian 
Infantry Division, observed the raid 
from aboard HMS Calpe. Because 
he had received ambiguous reports 
that indicated the possibility of Essex 
having entered the city, Roberts 
ordered the FMR to land on Red 
Beach. The new target became the 
tobacco factory, which was supposed 
to be in Essex’s hands.10 
Around 0710 hours, the FMR 
landing craft crossed the smokescreen. 
The situation in front of them was 
not, however, the one expected: 
boats were scattered all along the 
seafront because of the smoke, the 
heavy fire and the currents. Because 
of this, a considerable part of the 
unit landed on White Beach. A and 
C Companies landed on the narrow 
strip of beach under the cliffs west 
of the Casino while D and HQ 
Companies landed ashore in front 
of the casino. B Company was the 
only one to have disembarked in 
front of the tobacco factory on Red 
Beach. Despite heavy losses, the 
officers were trying, with difficulty to 
regroup and organize their sub-units. 
Although some FMR detachments 
managed to enter the city during 
the operation, most of the men 
remained on the beach sheltering 
from the heavy enemy fire. Therefore, 
they became perfect targets for the 
German troops. At 0930 hours, nearly 
four hours and a half after the start 
of the operation, it became clear 
that none of the objectives would 
be achieved. After some hesitation, 
Roberts set the withdrawal for 1100 
hours and this extremely difficult 
task ended three hours later. For the 
FMR, the operation was horrific – of 
32 officers and 552 other ranks that 
embarked for Jubilee, only 5 officers 
and 120 men returned to England; 
8 officers and 111 men were killed, 
2 officers and 48 other ranks were 
wounded and 19 officers and 225 
other ranks were taken prisoners.11 
 Despite the flaws of the plan 
and the fierce resistance encountered 
during the landing it is appropriate 
to question whether the men were 
ready to deal with the inherent 
complexities of Operation Jubilee. Of 
course, members of the infantry unit 
had to master the various technical 
elements of amphibious operations: 
the landing and re-embarkation 
from a craft, swimming, handling 
of light and heavy weapons as well 
as explosives and long-range radios, 
transporting of the wounded, in 
addition to “hardening” training. 
Furthermore, the men of the FMR 
were also required to know the 
tactical concepts related to this 
type of operation such as technical 
landing and embarkation through 
a smokescreen, village fighting, and 
night fighting. More specifically, 
the infantrymen needed to become 
familiar with cooperation with tanks, 
the RN, and the RAF. Indeed, support 
weapons belonging to the battalion 
were not enough to cross the beach. It 
was therefore necessary to master the 
elements of the all-arms cooperation 
to maintain heavy fire support to 
suppress the enemy.12 
On the other hand, the faulty 
communication system between the 
beaches, the RAF, ships, and tanks 
during the operation had resulted 
in a lack of fire support for the FMR 
from the various services, causing 
a significant number of losses even 
before they arrived on the beach. This 
same failure forced the unit and sub-
unit commanders to improvise and 
work without direction from their 
superiors. Above all, the operational 
role assigned to the FMR in Operation 
Jubilee necessarily implied that the 
senior and junior leaders possessed 
great flexibility and initiative since 
the unit may have been required to 
strengthen any vital sector of the Red 
and White Beaches. Thus, the question 
is whether these officers were ready 
to lead their sub-units on the beach 
and to improvise leaving the beach as 
quickly as possible. Speed, initiative 
and instinct was therefore imperative 
to allow companies to spread out as 
A German photo taken immediate after 
the Dieppe raid shows prisoners of war 
from the Fusiliers Mont-Royal.
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much as possible and then regroup 
inland near their objectives. Thus, the 
historian seeking to explain the level 
of preparation of the FMR’s officers 
needs to examine the pre-war state of 
the Canadian Army.13 
On the eve of the 
Second World War
On 1 September 1939, General Order 135 established the active 
army. This directive affected, amongst 
others, the FMR, one of the first 
units of the Non-Permanent Active 
Militia (NPAM) to be mobilized for 
the Canadian Active Service Force. 
However, before the Second World 
War, the fighting value of the FMR 
men was almost negligible. Political 
and institutional elements affected 
the establishment of effective training 
within the unit. 
The Canadian Militia had two 
components: the Permanent Active 
Militia (PAM) – the regular force 
composed of professional soldiers, 
and the NPAM – the part-time force. 
From the earliest days of the war, 
these two components suffered 
from a severe lack of preparation. 
Members of the PAM had a total of 
about 4,000 men and 400 officers, but 
completely lacked modern military 
equipment. Since the end of the 
previous war, Canada’s military had 
a minuscule budget. The memories 
of the massacres on European soil a 
quarter of a century earlier maintained 
pacifist sentiments as well as the idea, 
or hope, of Canada being a “fire-proof 
house.”14 The economic crisis of the 
1930s reinforced the pattern of little 
attention being placed on defence 
matters. The memories of the divisions 
within the Canadian population 
over conscription in 1917 also led 
Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie 
King to essentially reject Canadian 
rearmament until 1937. Budget 
constraints and lack of attention to 
the army thus partly explained the 
general lack of preparation of the 
Canadian Army.15
For the FMR, the consequences 
were significant. This lack of interest 
in military affairs from both the 
government and the population 
made recruiting difficult. In the 
case of the Montreal unit, between 
1930 and 1939, regimental strength 
wavered from 269 to 428 NCOs 
and men with an average of 345, 
approximately 50 percent of the 
normal establishment. Compared 
to other units of the NPAM, the 
FMR’s size was fairly representative. 
However, the regiment was much 
larger than other Francophone units, 
an impressive accomplishment 
considering the small recruitment 
pool in Montreal’s French Canadian 
population who held generally 
negative views of the military.16
These elements also played a role 
in the recruitment of the Royal 22e 
Régiment (R22eR), the Permanent 
Force regiment that provided a 
training cadre for teaching part-time 
militia units of Military Districts 4 
and 5. Historians Jean Pariseau and 
Serge Bernier emphasized that the 
R22eR faced significant recruitment 
difficulties. Its average complement 
of 14 officers and 390 NCOs and 
other ranks in the inter-war period 
did not allow for the development 
of a cadre to lead in establishing 
rigorous and effective training. The 
situation did not improve on the eve 
of war because, in 1939, the unit’s 
strength only totalled 19 officers, 165 
NCOs and other ranks.17 As a result 
the manpower shortage severely 
limited training opportunities for 
Quebec’s part-time militia and 
Permanent Force units. The small 
French-Canadian training staff from 
the R22eR compromised the quality 
of training provided to other militia 
units in Quebec.
Even if the number of recruits 
was adequate or the budgets allowed 
the supply of modern weapons, 
the tactical knowledge transmitted 
proved to be flawed. Since the R22eR 
provided the training cadre for 
Quebec part-time units like the 
FMR, the tactical training given in 
this unit formed the foundation 
on which others built. According 
to historian Yves Tremblay, these 
activities were limited to “spit-and-
polish,” physical training and close-
order drill. Individual handling of 
weapons, target shooting and route 
marches made up the rest of the 
training. Clearly the training of the 
regular soldier was quite limited. 
By extension, one can believe that 
training militia units followed a 
similar but slower pace.18 According 
to the regimental history of another 
infantry regiment of the NPAM, 
the Régiment de la Chaudière, it 
seems that social activities during 
the inter-war years formed the bulk 
of the training while exercises were 
limited mainly to the handling of 
rifles. For the FMR, the findings from 
the regimental history reading are 
even more appalling: parades and 
uniforms were the main interests of 
their military activities.19
With regard to the officers, 
their training also suffered from 
limited recruitment and budgetary 
constraints during the inter-war 
period. Indeed, the lack of enlisted 
recruits drastically reduced the 
opportunities for officers to practice 
the art of command or handling of 
their men as well as implementation of 
tactics. In one year, militia personnel 
trained one or two nights a week in 
addition to spending 15 days at the 
annual summer camp if the state of 
the commanding officer’s personal 
finances and those of the unit allowed 
for it.20 The FMR sent troops four 
times to the annual exercises during 
the decade preceding the war, for 
an average of 175 officers and men 
per year. From this figure, one must 
question whether the number of men 
sent in 1937 (one officer and nine other 
ranks) enabled the advancement 
of training, as most officers knew 
nothing of the art of command.21 
Historian David French has 
shown that the preparation of British 
regimental officers suffered from a 
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number of deficiencies including the 
lack of opportunities to train properly. 
In the 1930s, tactical training for 
infantry officers was decentralized. 
The situation was worse for the 
infantry since, unlike other service 
branches, it had no centralized 
school. Since the Canadian Militia 
started out in the British organization, 
Yves Tremblay points out that the 
same defects existed in the Canadian 
training system. The infantry officers, 
after being commissioned, went 
directly to the regiment to learn how 
to lead their men and were entirely 
dependent upon their sergeant for 
learning basic skills. This approach 
also brought a large variation in 
training value provided to the men 
as well as in the interpretation of 
tactical doctrine. Secondly, tactical 
training given to reserve officers 
generally remained low due to the 
predominance of administrative 
and disciplinary tasks developed 
in the militia course.22 Indeed, 
Tremblay pointed out in an article 
that “reserve officers of a higher rank 
than lieutenant were virtually left to 
fend for themselves, that is to say 
that they had to read and interpret 
the tactical brochures on which they 
could lay the hand on or, for some, to 
satisfy themselves with summaries 
appearing in the Canadian Defence 
Quarterly.”23
In short, the level of training 
given to the FMR men until the 
Second World War proved to be 
poor. It shows that the status of the 
NPAM at the outbreak of the war 
was relatively limited. Indeed, in 
1939, several candidates of the FMR 
were rejected for medical reasons. 
In addition, many men would serve 
as a cadre to form the second-line 
battalion. This explains why, at the 
announcement of mobilization in 
1939, the number of FMR was even 
lower than its actual peacetime 
strength. Moreover, the French-
Canadian regiment only had 227 
soldiers, including 26 officers, when 
the mobilization order came in.24 The 
FMR would have had to recruit and 
train about three quarters of their 
establishment before they had been 
ready to take the field. It is important 
to note that the tactical training 
provided to officers who would 
themselves be training Canadian 
force units was particularly low in 
both theory and practice until the 
eve of the conflict. Of course, the 
Canadian government based its 
policies on the British wait-and-see 
strategy, but the fact remains that it 
took at least 18-24 months of training 
to really be able to cope with the 
German Army.25 
Lieutenant-Colonel 
Grenier’s era
The combat capability of the FMR depended upon the quality of the 
officers and their ability to train the 
men to perform the tasks they had 
to undertake. However, the state of 
readiness of the FMR’s officers at 
the beginning of the conflict was 
lamentable. At the outbreak of war, 
lack of accommodations, shortages 
of uniforms, weapons, ammunition, 
vehicles, and training sites explained, 
in part, the inadequate start-state of 
training in the FMR as well as many 
of the other units and formations of 
the Canadian Active Service Force.26 
The comments from one of FMR’s 
sergeant-instructors are particularly 
interesting in this regard: 
[I] was theoretically in charge of the 
anti-tank platoon, responsible for 
defence of the battalion with six anti-
tank guns called “two pounders.” 
My men soon knew theory of parts, 
nomenclature, assembly and stops, 
and the commands because we 
Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Grenier commanded the FMR at the start of the war. Though 
he had fought on the Western Front with the Royal 22nd Regiment, he was not up to 
the task of commanding the FMR in the Second World War.
Ph
ot
o 
co
ur
te
sy
 o
f t
he
 M
us
ée
 R
ég
im
en
ta
ire
 le
s 
Fu
si
lie
rs
 M
on
t-R
oy
al
5
: Training for Operation Jubilee Tactics and Training in the Fusiliers Mont-Royal and the Dieppe Raid, 1939-1942
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
22
managed to get an instruction book 
for this gun. But we had neither 
guns nor their gun tractors. There 
were also three trucks for the whole 
battalion! We had no ammunition. 
What was so funny, it was to make a 
semblance of manoeuvre, in front of  
a picture of the gun, because we had 
no gun! Try therefore under these 
conditions to maintain the interest 
of soldiers!27
After Montreal and the unit’s 
brief period of training at Camp 
Valcartier (only one month in June 
1940), the FMR soldiers went directly 
to garrison duty in defence of Iceland. 
Their main task was to support the 
building of the Kaldadarnes airport 
and a network of trenches, as well 
as various island-defence schemes 
which drastically limited training 
opportunities. Physical training, 
parade drill, rifle training and route 
marches constituted the bulk of the 
routine. Activities necessary for 
the defence of Iceland interrupted 
the rhythm of individual training 
between July and October 1940. In 
fact, this meant that basic individual 
training would only resume in 
September of 1940. In short, when 
the FMR troops set foot in the United 
Kingdom in November 1940, none 
of them could boast that they had 
completely mastered the basic skills 
normally taught in a maximum time 
period of 12 weeks. Then again, the 
problems arising from a harried 
mobilization and tasks in defence of 
Iceland do not entirely explain FMR 
training deficiencies.28
 The inexperience of the battalion’s 
leadership was another stumbling 
block. The FMR officers generally had 
no military knowledge because of the 
poor state of militia training during 
the interwar period. With the war 
beginning, one would have thought 
that the training of junior officers 
would progress quickly. It did not 
help that Lieutenant-Colonel Paul 
Grenier, the commanding officer of 
the regiment, was not up to the task 
of correcting training deficiencies. 
Grenier was born in Montreal in 1893, 
joined the army as a lieutenant in 1915 
and served in France and Belgium 
with the R22eR where he was badly 
wounded at Passchendaele. By the 
end of the war, he was a captain. 
Between the wars, Grenier stayed in 
the NPAM where he was promoted 
to major in 1928. He was the FMR’s 
second in command from 1934 until 
he took command of the unit in early 
1938 at age 45 when he was promoted 
to lieutenant-colonel.29 
According to his  personal 
military files, he never passed the 
Militia Staff Course and he only 
attended the Senior Officer’s Course 
in January and February 1941. 
He did not really excel at Senior 
Officer School even if the school’s 
commandant, Brigadier W. Robb, 
was enthusiastic about Grenier’s 
personality. In a report, Robb stated 
that he was unsure about his tactical 
knowledge but put the blame on the 
question of language.30 However, 
when British Lieutenant-General 
Bernard L. Montgomery, commander 
of the South-Eastern Command in 
England, reviewed the Canadian 
units and their commanders in the 
spring of 1942, he concluded that 
Grenier was a poor leader. Indeed, in 
Montgomery’s mind, the “weak link 
in this [Brigade] is the [FMR].” He 
placed much of the fault on Grenier’s 
shoulders as he said that he did not 
“believe that Grenier has the military 
knowledge and professional ability 
to produce a good and well-trained 
[battalion]. He has commanded the 
[battalion] for over 5 years and is 
nearly 50 years old. He should really 
be replaced by a better and younger 
man.”31 Lieutenant-General H.D.G. 
Crerar (GOC I Canadian Corps) also 
expressed such an opinion in a letter 
to Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart 
(Chief of the General Staff), which 
contended: 
his tactical abilities are open to doubt 
and may well prove inadequate 
during the approaching tests of unit 
and formation exercises in which 
case we shall need to dispose of his 
services that account. Further while 
he was in commanded [of] his unit for 
some six years both past and current 
Brigade [commanders] and [Division 
commander] here have indicated 
their inability to recommend him for 
further promotion in field.32
The training given to officers 
and other ranks thus suffered 
from Grenier’s deficiencies as a 
commander. First, the training lacked 
realism. All the instructions were 
given in form of lectures with no 
effective follow-up tactical exercises 
without troops (TEWTs) or field 
training exercises to apply what 
had been learned. Furthermore, it 
is quite obvious when one looks at 
the war diary that the battalion’s 
officers received very limited specific 
training to improve their individual 
skills. During the 31 months that 
Grenier was in command of the FMR, 
four TEWTs were the only training 
dedicated to his officers. Of those 
exercises, only one was given by 
Grenier on the subject of a company 
in the attack; another was led by 
the commanding officer of Calgary 
Regiment (Tank), Lieutenant-Colonel 
J.G. Andrews, on tank-infantry 
cooperation; and the last two others 
were given by unit junior officers on 
the defence of a village and on the 
appreciation of the ground.33 
However, the FMR’s officers 
had to absorb a significant amount 
of knowledge in order to practice 
minor tactics and fieldcraft. As 
historian Timothy Harrison Place 
noted, “such highly practical skills 
cannot readily be mastered by book-
learning alone.”34 Unfortunately, 
most of the training received by 
officers and NCOs in these areas 
was theoretical. This was clearly 
insufficient for junior leaders charged 
with leading others into battle. 
These exercises did not allow for 
the reproduction of the sounds and 
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confusion of the battlefield. This 
meant that the FMR officers were 
lacking both the depth of military 
expertise and tactical knowledge 
about modern warfare. Therefore, 
opportunities for improving the 
tactical knowledge of the unit’s 
officers fell almost exclusively on 
the training obtained outside the 
battalion. Thus, it was essential that 
officers have the opportunity to take 
courses offered by the Canadian and 
British armies in England.35
Yet ,  according to the unit 
war diary, from the beginning of 
mobilization to November 1940, only 
one officer had passed the Militia Staff 
Course and one junior officer went to 
the Infantry Company Commanders’ 
Course. Until the Dieppe raid, the 
FMR’s war diarist noted that only 
two other officers went to the Infantry 
Company Commanders’ Course, 
while one attended the Junior War 
Staff Course and another went to 
the Canadian Corps Junior Leader 
School. If one focuses on the military 
records of officers killed in action 
during the raid, one can see that 
the situation did not improve with 
time. Of the six files available for 
consultation, one had attended the 
Infantry Company Commanders’ 
Course and only one other had 
passed through the Canadian Junior 
Leader School.36 
The small number of subaltern 
officers who attended the army 
courses seemed to slowly improve 
unit’s collective training. However, 
training varied widely from company 
to company under Grenier’s direction. 
While some companies lingered 
on elementary individual training, 
others conducted diverse tactical 
training, which started in May and 
June 1941. Company exercises in 
attack, defence, and withdrawal 
began to emerge in the better-led sub-
units. The small number of officers 
who attended courses between 
November 1940 and November 
1941 meant that most of the unit’s 
junior officers were dependent on 
the knowledge and skills of their 
commanding officer to improve 
their own individual capacity, which 
partly explained the wide variations 
in their tactical and leadership skills 
as well as those of the sub-units they 
led.37
New training initiatives
If they wanted to improve their tactical knowledge, the regiment’s 
senior and junior officers could 
turn to official doctrine stated in 
the training pamphlets produced 
by the British Army. Unfortunately, 
the theoretical knowledge provided 
b y  t h e  p a m p h l e t s  h a d  s o m e 
shortcomings. At the end of the First 
World War the British Army had 
recognized that firepower dominated 
the battlefield. To be able to advance 
on the battlefield it was necessary to 
combine firepower with movement. 
To achieve this, the British favoured 
a creeping barrage as a means for the 
infantry to advance at a short distance 
from the enemy. Canadian tactical 
doctrine, on the eve of the Second 
World War still embraced the need 
to consolidate gains on the battlefield 
before exploiting success. The aim 
was to minimize losses arising from 
any offensive movement. Therefore, 
Allied attacks would always be very 
slow and bound to the constraints of 
artillery fire plan.38 
The state of British and Canadian 
doctrine in the summer of 1939 is best 
explained by a 1937 army pamphlet 
entitled Infantry Training: Training 
and War, which was the last pre-war 
infantry doctrinal literature available 
for subaltern commanders until early 
1941. Here, one can see that the ideal 
to which soldiers were to aspire was 
based on a doctrinal dichotomy: 
initiative was encouraged while 
discipline and obedience were also 
emphasized. 
In all wars soldiers have been 
required who are disciplined, 
physically fit and skilled with 
their weapons. In modern war, 
with its more powerful weapons 
and greater decentralization, the 
responsibility of the individual has 
been increased and he therefore 
requires a far higher degree of 
individual initiative than was 
formerly necessary. 
Commanders must do all that 
they can to encourage initiative 
and individuality, remembering 
always that  these  must  be 
disciplined.39 
Yet, the rapid and unexpected 
German victory over France in 
the spring of 1940 highlighted the 
British Army’s slow tempo in action, 
due to outdated tactics and lack 
of initiative at all levels, as well 
as the German Army’s superior 
training. The introduction of machine 
guns and tanks on the battlefield 
meant that soldiers had to disperse 
to survive. This also meant that 
from that point on, decision-making 
capacity was needed by all soldiers. 
This required initiative, intelligence 
and military knowledge.40 The British 
Army’s outdated doctrine was 
particularly evident in the system 
of autocratic command and control 
that stifled initiative at all levels. 
Indeed, this convinced some British 
and Canadian military officers of 
much needed changes in the battle 
doctrine, organization and training 
for the armed forces.41 
As head of the British I Corps 
after Dunkirk, Lieutenant-General 
Harold Alexander spread the use of 
tactical training drill in his formation. 
The publication of a pamphlet, I 
Corps Tactical Notes, in the fall of 
1940 favoured the dissemination of 
this tactical guide for soldiers. The 
War Office, after some resistance, 
published the pamphlet in February 
1941 under the title Tactical Notes 
for Platoon Commanders. Although 
Alexander’s foreword was omitted 
and there was no reference to the 
term “battle drills,” the aim of the 
pamphlet published by the War 
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Office was to serve, as a tactical 
guide for platoon commanders and, 
in this way, was a step towards 
improvement.42 In this document, the 
author of the pamphlet mentioned 
the lessons of the events of 1939-1940 
presented above, and added that
To-day, against an exceedingly 
quick and bold opponent who relies 
for success on surprise in the form 
of rapid infiltration, we shall find 
ourselves at a grave disadvantage 
if we cannot be as quick, bold, 
and enterprising as he is…Let us, 
therefore, keep before our eyes this 
guiding principle – SPEED. Speed 
in making up our minds, speed 
in delivering our orders, speed in 
reconnaissance, and, finally, speed 
in execution.43
Battle drill was a method of 
teaching minor infantry tactics and 
fieldcraft that emphasized fire and 
movement and was directly aimed 
at section, platoon and company 
leaders. It was a flexible type of 
training where soldiers rehearsed 
situations encountered on the 
battlefield. The acquisition of a 
tactical instinct was the fundamental 
objective of battle drill so that junior 
officers and NCOs were able to 
adapt to circumstances faced in real 
combat. As such, battle drill broke 
down manoeuvres into a series of 
basic movements – a very important 
aspect that made it different from 
other training methods. In practice, 
the objectives of battle drill were to 
enhance the physical capabilities of 
individual soldiers; to show them 
how to use the ground, to maximize 
the use of small arms and to teach 
them teamwork from the section 
upward. Battle drill also implied 
improved realism in the exercises and 
the introduction of battle inoculation 
to prepare troops for the sights and 
sounds of war.44 Both theoretical 
and practical exercises of increasing 
complexity were introduced on topics 
as varied as village fighting, street 
fighting, river-crossings, attacks of all 
sorts and night movement.45
Still, John English, in his study 
The Canadian Army and the Normandy 
Campaign, is more critical of this 
form of training. According to him, 
the battle inoculation aspect was 
pushed to the extreme by trying to 
bring the soldiers to “kill joyfully.” 
English questions the value of the 
use of live fire since nothing can 
replace the experience of being shot 
at with the intent to kill. In addition, 
he argues that battle drill was a 
training method that was too rigid 
and impeded the junior officers’ 
tactical understanding. English might 
be correct on the battle inoculation 
flaws, but is not on the tactical 
rigidity of this training method. The 
primary purpose of battle drill was to 
instill initiative and independence to 
junior leaders as a way of surviving 
on the battlefield.46
Battle drill was introduced 
in the Canadian Army when the 
2nd Canadian Division worked 
with the 47th (London) Division 
during the summer of 1941. The 
Opposite: Canadian troops taking part in 
Battle Drill training, England, December 
1941.
Top right: Canadian soldiers race along 
a riverbed while conducting assault 
training at Aldershot, England in August 
1942.
Bottom right: A Vickers gun crew 
relocates their weapon during training 
in June or July 1942.
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Calgary Highlanders sent 
some officers to attend 
demonstrations of this 
new tact ical  method 
in October. Upon their 
return, they prepared a 
similar training course 
which was taught to all 
platoons and companies 
of the regiment. From 
November 1941 onward, 
the regiment received 
members from other 
Canadian regiments. 
In fact, one can see that 
2nd Division’s Training 
Instruction No.6 dated 
2 8  N o v e m b e r  1 9 4 1 
focussed on the need for 
individual training and 
specifically mentioned 
that special attention 
should be placed on the 
Tactical Notes for Platoon 
Commanders pamphlet 
as well as on battle drill 
training.47
S ix  FMR of f icers 
attended batt le  dri l l 
courses from November 
1941 to May 1942 and the unit began 
battle drill training from January 1942 
onward. This new type of training 
worked well and was received 
positively by men as additional 
officers returned from battle drill 
courses to share what they had 
learned.48 The unit war diarist noted 
at the beginning of March 1942 that 
“More and more, a greater number 
of officers are sent on these courses 
(Battle Drill) from where they come 
back with new and better ideas from 
which the Unit will greatly improve. 
It is hoped that this Battalion will 
shortly arrive to a very high standard 
of training.”49 The introduction of 
battle drill allowed the dissemination 
of a common understanding of the 
doctrine at lower command levels. 
For the men and officers of the 
FMR, it was a welcome change to 
the dull training regimen that had 
been in effect since 1939. Moreover, 
the new tactical exercises against 
an “opponent” – a specialized 
group of instructors playing the 
role of the enemy – enabled a better 
understanding of desired responses. 
In fact, from the company level down, 
decisions were measured in seconds, 
not after lengthy consideration and 
so that type of training was much 
needed.50
Despite all these improvements 
in the unit’s training, there would 
be a more drastic change in April 
1942. When Lieutenant-General 
Montgomery reviewed the Canadian 
units and their commanders that 
Spring, he concluded that Grenier 
was a poor commander. To remedy 
this situation, Crerar appointed 
Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard Ménard 
to replace Grenier. Ménard was born 
in Montreal in 1913 and studied 
business at Université Laval before 
enrolling in the Royal Military College 
(RMC) in Kingston. He 
graduated from the RMC 
in 1932 and received his 
lieutenant’s commission 
in 1936 in the R22eR. He 
served in India from 1938 
to 1940 where he took 
part in the Waziristan 
c a m p a i g n  w i t h  t h e 
South Waziristan Scouts. 
After being promoted 
to captain in 1939, he 
was assigned to the 2nd 
Division HQ as liaison 
officer in mid-1940 and 
went overseas with this 
formation. In June 1941, 
he was promoted to major 
and transferred to the 
R22eR before returning to 
Canada to take the Junior 
War Staff Course at RMC. 
He spent a short period at 
8th Brigade headquarters 
before given command 
of the FMR in April 
1942. At the age of 29, 
he was the youngest 
lieutenant-colonel in the 
Commonwealth.51
From the start, Ménard turned 
the battalion’s routine upside-down. 
First, he evaluated his officers and 
replaced those who were under-
trained or unfit. He took charge of 
officer and NCO training, something 
that Grenier had never done. Officers’ 
days were held every week, during 
which he showed them, amongst 
other things, how to train their men. 
The battalion war diary entry of 27 
April is particularly interesting in this 
regard and says much about the lack 
of officer training prior to Ménard’s 
arrival. “An ‘Officer’s Day’ has been 
held today and this new kind of 
training was enjoyed by all Officers. 
Much enthusiasm has been shown 
in the preparation of the discussion 
and T.E.W.T’s.”52 Subjects covered 
by Ménard in the next months were 
varied, in direct line with the battle 
drill guidelines, and focussed on 
minor tactics, namely verbal orders, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard Ménard replaced Grenier in April 1942 
and immediately instituted a more rigourous training program for 
the regiment.
Ca
na
di
an
 F
or
ce
s 
ph
ot
o 
ZK
-2
8
10
Canadian Military History, Vol. 22 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 3
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss4/3
27
the use of the ground, and the making 
of a plan. In short, he improved and 
standardized training through the 
whole battalion, an essential change 
before beginning a much more 
elaborate training programme. 
Simmer Force: Combined 
operations training
In anticipation of Operation Rutter, the original plan to attack Dieppe, 
the men of the FMR arrived on the 
Isle of Wight on 19 May 1942 where 
they would become “a first class 
‘Assault’ Unit of the highest quality” 
according to the unit’s war diary.53 
Amphibious operations constitute 
one of the most complex types of 
operations. The majority of the forces 
which took part in Operation Jubilee 
were completely unfamiliar with 
tasks they had to perform and had 
to be given special training to ensure 
cooperation between the various 
services besides familiarizing all 
individuals with operations of this 
nature.54 
The training program for the 
2nd Infantry Division provided 
a progression in three phases: 
technical instructions, tactics related 
to amphibious operations, and a 
last stage to progressively integrate 
large-scale exercises with all the 
components participating in the final 
operation. For men of the FMR, the 
technical training had to be alternated 
with the tactical training probably due 
to time constraints and administrative 
work resulting from sending the 
reconnaissance detachment too 
shortly before the arrival of the 
remainder of the division. Therefore, 
the unavailabil i ty of  training 
areas, the lack of ammunition and 
equipment as well as the paperwork 
that had to be completed during 
the first week on the island caused 
several cancellations and changes 
in the training program.55 As such, 
2nd Division’s first training report 
is most telling about the training 
problems: “If training cannot go 
forward more steadily than it has in 
the past, training in some units will 
not be complete by the time exercises 
are ready to commence.”56
Thus, the period between 20 May 
and 12 June stood out for its use of 
more theoretical training where men 
became familiar with the concepts 
related to amphibious operations 
while including progressively 
practical exercises. In the case of 
the FMR, emphasis during this 
period was placed on landing and 
embarkation exercises, demolition 
and heavy explosives, and village 
fighting in addition with battle 
drill. Like other units of Simmer 
Force – 2nd Division’s name for this 
operation – special attention was paid 
to physical fitness, the aim being the 
ability to walk nearly 18 kilometres 
in full assault kit in 120 minutes. 
However, on 28 May, the training 
Though tanks played an important role 
in Operation Jubilee, little combined 
arms training took place before the raid.
Above right: Churchill tanks line up for 
an inspection during an assault training 
exercise in July 1942.
Below right: A Churchill from the Calgary 
Tank Regiment exits a tank landing 
craft during Exercise Yukon I, 11-12 
June 1942.
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report indicated that “In the assault 
courses, troops were able to complete 
the course but were, in many cases, 
unable to fight or fire effectively 
when finished.”57 This would explain 
why the training report of 6 June still 
lingered on the physical condition of 
the men. This same report indicated 
that “The condition of the men has 
improved and better results have 
been secured from speed marches 
but it has become evident that in the 
short time available, training to the 
standard required is not possible 
without sacrificing other valuable 
training.”58
Therefore,  l i t t le  room was 
made for “valuable training” such 
as all-arms cooperation, a major 
shortcoming in regard to the limited 
focus on this particular aspect 
since the beginning of the war and 
the role of fire support during the 
assault on Dieppe. Besides landing 
exercises, which necessarily involved 
members of the navy, no exercise 
was done in collaboration with the 
14th Army Tank Regiment (Calgary 
Regiment) or the RAF for this period. 
In addition, on 21 May some expected 
tactical situations such as street fight 
exercises were carried out under 
the command of NCOs, while the 
officers acted as umpires. It was 
difficult then for officers, especially 
for young officers, to learn how to 
manage their sub-unit in these tactical 
situations not to mention having to 
increase their own initiative on the 
battlefield.59 
On 2 June, a larger exercise, Mox, 
gradually increased the realism of 
the training even though it did not 
involve enemy fire. Mox’s principal 
objective was to “practise the 
landing of a raiding force who had 
to go 1 or 2 miles inland to effectuate 
tasks previously detailed and then 
withdraw to its boats.” The men 
of FMR were conducting their first 
assault under the command of Major 
J.R. Painchaud, second in command 
of the unit. On the same day, a 
second landing at Colwell Bay was 
also planned at noon where the unit 
had to complete the assault of a cliff. 
According to the unit’s war diary, 
“The first landing went very well 
same as withdrawal, the only points 
which were feeble was [sic] few sub-
units bunching on the beach and so 
other losing temporarily direction 
in the dark.” This observation is 
particularly interesting, especially 
when one knows that no enemy 
defended the beach and, therefore, 
the men of the FMR were not under 
fire.60 
The first training test was done 
during the night of 11-12 June with 
Exercise Yukon. It was created with 
the operational plan in mind and was 
therefore designed to practice the 
technique and details of Operation 
Rutter. Thus, all units involved were 
practicing their roles on a stretch of 
coastline at West Bay near Bridport in 
Dorset County which looked similar 
to the Dieppe area. Three tasks were 
given to the FMR. The unit was to 
land on a beach and then establish 
a protected area for units that 
had to withdraw after completing 
their tasks. Then, the FMR would 
constitute a reserve that could be sent 
against any dangerous point on Red, 
White or Green beaches on division 
commander’s orders. Finally, the 
unit had to cover demolition teams in 
operation in the West Bay Harbour.61 
Even though Yukon began as 
scheduled at 0500 hours, the rest of the 
operation was not going according to 
Officers of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal photographed in June 1942 during the Simmer Force training on the Isle of Wight. Lieutenant-
Colonel Ménard is seated in the centre; Major J.R. Painchaud, the unit’s second-in-command is seated to the left of Ménard. Eight 
of the officers in this photo were killed during the raid.
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plan. Several units landed miles away 
from the beaches and landing craft 
transporting the tanks arrived more 
than an hour late, which resulted 
in major chaos on the beaches. The 
delay in the landing and the slow 
pace of the infantry advance inland 
caused problems in the achievement 
of the objectives. The FMR landed 
on Red Beach at 0715 hours, its 
four companies reaching their 
objectives after searching buildings 
and destroying all remaining enemy 
defences. The men remained on 
the beach for nine hours holding a 
protective perimeter to cover the 
withdrawal of other regiments. 
The battalion then progressively 
reduced its perimeter before battalion 
headquarters and platoon rearguards 
final re-embarkation under the 
protect ion of  a  smokescreen. 
However, problems met in Yukon 
forced the military authorities to 
put in place another rehearsal to 
allow for additional training before 
undertaking Operation Rutter. On 23 
June, Yukon II was carried out at the 
same place. Though it was slightly 
better than the first exercise, the lack 
of precision as to the time and place 
of landing as well as the use of smoke 
still complicated its execution for 
some units.62 
The purpose of these exercises 
was to achieve maximum realism 
while at the same time coming 
as close as possible to simulating 
conditions which would occur during 
the actual operation. To do this, 
the landing took place under an 
important simulated aerial bombing. 
Indeed, explosives were attached to 
an underwater wire, which if hit by a 
boat triggered a blast. Machine guns 
and snipers fired as close as possible 
to the assault troops in addition to 
using mortars to familiarize young 
These images, found in the FMR’s 
war diary, show various aspects of the 
Regiment’s participation in the Yukon 
exercises.
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soldiers with the sounds of modern 
warfare and to teach them to keep 
their heads down.63 
If the Yukon exercises were 
trying to recreate the most realistic 
conditions possible, the goal was 
not always achieved. First, the 
information obtained on the defence 
of Dieppe showed that the city 
was protected by “low-category 
troops amounting to one battalion, 
with 500 divisional or regimental 
troops in support, making no more 
than fourteen hundred men.”64 
These were second-class troops 
who were expected to be 40-45 
years old. Therefore, for Yukon I 
and Yukon II, an important and 
systematic defence was not part of 
the plan, as the role was assigned 
to a single battalion of local Home 
Guard troops. Furthermore, when 
the dummy aerial attack was carried 
out by Hurricanes, these local troops 
carefully took cover, which facilitated 
the advance of the assault units in the 
frontal attack.65 It is probably for this 
reason that an NCO from the FMR 
observed that when they landed 
on Red Beach during Operation 
Jubilee: “Everybody expected that 
we could land, take a position, and 
begin to shoot. That was not what 
happened.”66 
Another important factor for the 
FMR was that the only operational 
role they practiced during Yukon I 
and II was the protection of other 
units’ withdrawal. No reference 
was found in the war diary that 
referred to a situation where the 
FMR was sent into a specific area as 
a reserve to support the advance of 
Top left: FMR soldiers await evacuation 
from the beach following the conclusion 
of Exercise Yukon.
Middle left: Tank landing operations 
during Exercise Yukon II, 22-23 June 
1942.
Bottom left: An officer and two men from 
the FMR train at Newpound Common, 7 
August 1942.
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another unit. Indeed, the FMR were 
ordered during Operation Jubilee to 
disembark and support the attack of 
the Essex Scottish Regiment at Red 
Beach near the tobacco factory. This 
role involved flexibility, initiative, 
and instinct by junior leaders to avoid 
the beach becoming a killing zone 
under enemy fire. However, this was 
never practiced during the Yukon 
exercises.67 
T h i r d l y ,  B r i t i s h  A r m y 
amphibious operational doctrine 
put great emphasis on the support 
of tanks during a landing against 
a defended beach. However, the 
FMR did not train with the Calgary 
Regiment before Jubilee. Given their 
more static role on the cover of the 
withdrawal phase, the FMR did not 
advance inland in conjunction with 
the tanks. Indeed, the latter were 
ordered to land on the beach and 
form a bridgehead in support of the 
infantry. Yet, the FMR’s operational 
role during the attack of Dieppe 
necessarily required collaboration 
with tanks since the unit could not 
overwhelm the enemy with its own 
weapons and needed armoured 
fire support. Despite the various 
shortcomings of Exercises Yukon I 
and II, Operation Rutter was set to 
take place during the first period 
of favourable weather between 2 
and 8 July. Since the weather never 
improved, the raid was cancelled. 
The operation was revived under 
the code-name Jubilee and had the 
disastrous consequences we all know 
about today.68 
* * * * *
From 1939 to 1942, the men 
of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal began 
a drastic transformation of their 
training methods. The publication 
of the pamphlet Tactical Notes for 
Platoon Commanders in early 1941 and 
the introduction of battle drill in the 
training routine of officers and men 
of the FMR late in 1941 were critical 
improvements. Officer training 
improved significantly with the 
arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Ménard 
who introduced more systematic 
training to increase their leadership 
and tactical understanding. This 
progress was also a result of the 
changes Crerar introduced in I 
Canadian Corps’s training policy in 
1942. Before the assault on Dieppe, 
corps training instructions had 
already stressed the importance 
Canadian troops practice assault landings, July 1942.
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of  infantry-tank cooperat ion, 
individual weapons competence 
and the importance of training junior 
leadership. 
Yet, it has to be understood that 
those “new” concepts of training were 
introduced in the FMR’s training 
program nearly two years after 
the onset of the war and only eight 
months before the raid. The uneven 
training standards and methods 
presented within the unit can be 
explained, in large part, because in 
the period of time before 1942, the 
FMR’s senior officers were allowed to 
decide for themselves how to apply 
the doctrine and train their troops. 
In fact, it was only in August 1942 
that the development of a common 
doctrine on training methods was 
established as a training standard 
and then reiterated in the training 
instructions of October 1942 and 
April 1943. 
That Crerar had yet to stress the 
importance of having a common 
doctrine after three years of conflict 
seems distressing. The Canadian 
m i l i t a r y ’ s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  w a s 
compromised by the inability of 
infantry officers to convey the lessons 
learned in the first years of the war 
as we have seen here. Thus, when the 
combined training was introduced 
in the Spring of 1942, 2nd Division’s 
infantry officers had to learn the 
techniques and tactics of such a 
complex type of operation in addition 
to performing their regular duties. 
Whether they really mastered all of 
the elements is another question. 
This probably explains why, after 
the raid, the combined operations 
training and exercises, individual 
and junior leadership initiatives 
as well as the use of fire support 
were given primary importance. 
Specific consideration was given to 
beach landings, the establishment of 
beach bridgeheads and operations at 
brigade and battalion levels against 
enemy-defended localities, especially 
in towns and villages. Perhaps those 
questions were the true lessons 
learned on this very tragic day. Thus, 
the next time the Canadians attacked 
the Atlantic Wall they would be 
better prepared for the fight.69 
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